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ABSTRACT

After years of uncertainty regarding the level of intent required to prove liability for inducing
patent infringement, the Federal Circuit, in DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., finally endorsed the
specific intent standard detailed in the court's Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc.
decision. This article examines the ramifications of DSU Medical Corp., especially in relation to
the opinion of counsel defense to willful infringement. This article argues that the Federal
Circuit's reliance on Manville Sales and MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster was misplaced, and that
the adoption of the specific intent standard results in an elevated importance of the opinion of
counsel defense to inducement. This could lead to confusion of willfulness and inducement intent
for courts and juries, which, for policy reasons, should remain distinct.
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INTRODUCTION

After more than sixteen years of confusion, the Federal Circuit has finally responded to a
growing recognition that there is a "lack of clarity" regarding the level of intent required to prove
liability for inducing patent infringement. 1 This question was specifically addressed in an en banc
section of an otherwise traditional panel opinion in DSU Medical Corp. V. JMS Co., 2 where the
full court held that the specific intent standard articulated in Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount
Systems, Inc.3 controls the intent inquiry.4 It is now settled that proof of inducement, under 35
U.S.C. § 271(b), requires that the patentee show "the alleged infringer's actions induced infringing
acts and that he knew or should have known his actions would induce actual infringements. 5
The confusion over the level of intent necessary to prove liability stemmed from a pair of
1990 Federal Circuit decisions, both handed down within a few months of each other, which
appeared to establish conflicting standards for proving intent to induce infringement. The court in
the first decision, Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.,6 held that in order to prove
liability for inducement, it was necessary to find intent to cause the acts constituting infringement.
The second decision, Manville Sales, appeared to set the intent bar higher and held the plaintiff

must show that the alleged infringer induced the infringing acts and knew or should have known
his actions would cause actual infringement.8
To resolve this conflict, the Federal Circuit in DSU Medical followed Manville Sales, even
though that decision and its progeny fail to support the universal application of a specific intent
standard. 9

In DSU Medical, the court also looked to Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.

Grokster,l ° a landmark Supreme Court copyright opinion that borrowed from patent law
inducement, finding defendants liable for copyright infringement." The en banc panel in DSU
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inducement. Specifically, this court has historically required either a general or a specific level of intent to induce

infringement.") (internal citations omitted)).
2 471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
4 DSUMed. Corp., 471 F.3d at 1304.
Id.(quoting Manville Sales Corp, 917 F.2d at 553).
6 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
7 Id. at 1469.
8 Manville Sales Corp., 917 F.2d at 553.
9 DSU Med. Corp., 471 F.3d at 1305; Manville Sales Corp., 917 F.2d at 553.
545 U.S. 913 (2005).
Id.at 932, 940-41.
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Medical found that the Supreme Court's decision in Grokster "validated" the specific intent
standard for infringement. 12 However, the Court's holding in Grokster was unrelated to the intent
requirement and unconcerned with the aforementioned conflict.13
This article discusses the apparent conflict presented by Manville Sales and Hewlett-Packard
and the Federal Circuit's resolution in DSU Medical. Part I of this article begins with a brief
review of the role of intent in both direct and indirect patent infringement. Subsection A of Part I
notes that intent is not an element of direct infringement, while subsection B discusses the
rationale for indirect infringement. Part I concludes with a brief look at the effect of codification
on the role of intent in indirect infringement.
Part II discusses the Hewlett-Packardand Manville Sales decisions, in subsections A and B
respectively, with particular attention to the equitable considerations at play in Manville Sales.
This section posits that the original discrepancy in the intent standard was driven by equitable
considerations of two different panels presented with distinct factual situations, rather than by a
desire to create broad precedent on the intent requirement for inducement. In particular, this
article argues that the Manville Sales court articulated a stricter standard because it was troubled
by the fundamental unfairness, based on the facts before it, of holding defendant corporate officers
personally liable for inducement.
Part III begins by discussing the DSU Medical decision in subsection A, and then analyzes
the basis for the en banc holding in subsection B. Part 1 of subsection B argues that the precedent
followed by the Federal Circuit, Manville Sales, may more appropriately apply to the liability of
corporate officers, and therefore, does not support a universal specific intent standard for inducing
infringement. This section then surveys some Federal Circuit case law from the period between
Manville Sales and DSU Medical, which reveals some recognition by the court that the Manville
Sales standard applies to personal liability of corporate officers for inducing infringement.
Part 2 of subsection B further argues that Grokster does not provide support for the specific
intent standard. In particular, this article notes that Grokster adopted patent law inducement
because it offers liability premised on extrinsic indicia of intent, not because it brings a particular
level of intent to bear on liability. In addition, this section asserts that the Grokster Court
specifically refrained from selecting a particular level of intent and observes that the defendants in
Grokster would have been held liable for inducement under either standard. Finally, this article
argues that copyright law is an inappropriate source for divining the proper intent standard for
patent law inducement because copyright law lacks a significant opinion of counsel defense.
Part IV subsection A observes that the DSU Medical decision failed to address the
implications of universal application of the specific intent standard and discusses the most
significant of these -the heightened importance of the opinion of counsel defense to inducement.
Subsection B notes that the opinion of counsel defense to inducement will likely trigger the same
waiver of privilege and work product immunity as that for reliance on an opinion of counsel
defense for willfulness, which ultimately could lead to confusion in determining whether the
defendant is liable for willfulness and inducement. Ultimately, Part IV suggests that the likely
reliance on opinions of counsel by inducement defendants in the wake of DSU Medical could blur
the distinction between willfulness and intent to induce infringement as courts and patent
practitioners struggle to distinguish the state of mind required for each. These complex issues
may result in doctrinal confusion of willfulness and intent to induce infringement - an
undesirable result in view of the different policies behind the two doctrines.

2 DSU Med Corp.. 471 F.3d at 1306.
13

Grokster, 545 U.S. at 941.
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I. THE ROLE OF INTENT IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT

A. Intent Is Not an Element of DirectInfringement
Direct patent infringement is a strict liability offense; intent has never been considered by the
courts in determining direct patent infringement. 14 Long before direct infringement was codified
in the 1952 Patent Act, courts held that intent was irrelevant for a finding of infringement liability.
For example, in Thompson v. NT. Bushnell Co., 15 the court rejected the defense that the allegedly
infringing products were accidentally made and unintentionally sold because "the owner of a
patent is entitled to protection against the repetition of accidental infringements." 16 Similarly, in
Kawneer Manufacturing Co. v. Toledo Plate & Window Glass Co.,17 the court held the
"defendant's intention.., has nothing to do with the question of infringement so long as it sold
the infringing devices."1 8
The Patent Act of 1952 codified certain acts as direct infringement without regard to the
intent of the actor. Section 271 (a) of Title 35 provides that "whoever without authority makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the
patent."1 9 Furthermore, recent case law has confirmed that intent is not an element of direct patent
infringement and is irrelevant to the infringement analysis. 2 0 For example, in Embrex, Inc. v.
Service Engineering Corp., Judge Rader, in a concurring opinion, noted "the
Supreme Court and
21
this court have recently reiterated that intent is irrelevant to infringement.,

B. The Role of Intent in IndirectInfringement

1. The Rationalefor Indirect Infringement
The patent system would not provide complete protection to the inventor without an
enforcement mechanism that the patentee could use against indirect infringers. That is, the
patentee needs an effective enforcement tool against "any other activity where, although not
technically making, using or selling, the defendant displayed sufficient culpability to be held liable
as an infringer., 22 This tool is contributory infringement. As stated by Judge William Howard

14Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1596 F. 238 (2d Cir. 1899).
16 Id. at 243.
17232 F. 362 (E.D. Mich. 1915).
"XId. at 367.
19 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (2005).
2 See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35 (1997) ("Application of the
doctrine of equivalents, therefore, is akin to determining literal infringement, and neither requires proof of intent.");
Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring) ("[T]he Supreme
Court and this court have recently reiterated that intent is irrelevant to infringement.") Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 62
F.3d at 1519 ("Intent is not an element of infringement."); Intel Corp. v. U.S. lnt'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821,
832 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ('[T]here is no intent element to direct infringement.").
21 216 F.3d at 1353 (Rader. J., concurring).
22 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb. Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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Taft, sitting on the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the roots of contributory infringement
lay in tort principles:
An infringement of a patent is a tort analogous to trespass or trespass on the case. From
the earliest times, all who take part in a trespass, either by actual participation therein or
by aiding and abetting it, have been held to be jointly and severally liable for the injury
inflicted. There must be some concert of action between him who does the injury and
him who is charged with aiding and abetting, before the latter can be held liable. When
that is present, however, the joint liability of both the principal and the accomplice has
been invariably enforced. If this healthful rule is not to apply to trespass upon patent
property, then, indeed, the protection which is promised by the constitution and laws of
the United States to inventors is a poor sham.23
At the time Judge Taft wrote this, the most common situation giving rise to contributory
infringement liability was that in which a seller sold a component that was not itself covered by a
patent, but could only be used in a patented product or process. 24 He recognized the need for
contributory infringement in such a scenario:
Many of the most valuable patents are combinations of nonpatentable elements, and the
only effective mode of preventing infringement is by suits against those who, by
furnishing the parts which distinguish the combination, make it possible for others to
assemble and use the combination, and who, by advertisement of the sale of such parts
and otherwise, intentionally solicit and promote such invasions of the patentee's
rights.25
Accordingly, indirect infringement, specifically contributory infringement, was deemed necessary
to accomplish the goals of the patent system as a corollary to direct infringement.26
Unlike direct infringement, contributory infringement has always required proof of some
form of intent. In George Haiss Manufacturing Co. v. Link Belt Co., the court stated "[u]pon an
issue of the contributory infringement the intent of the alleged infringer is an essential fact to be
proved. ' 27 One appellate court noted "[i]t is the intent28 and purpose to aid and assist in bringing
about an infringement which is the essence of the tort.,

2. The Question of Intent in Inducement Under the 1952 Patent Act
23 Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721 (6th Cir. 1897).
24 See Hewlett-PackardCo., 909 F.2d at 1469.
25 See Thomson-Houston Elec. Co., 80 F. at 721.
26 The ability of a patentee or copyright owner to enforce his patent or copyright against indirect infringers is

perhaps even more important today as technological innovations have given huge numbers of individuals the tools
to infringe protected works directly, and it has become increasingly difficult to enforce intellectual property rights
against these individuals. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster. Ltd., 545 U.S. 913. 929-30 (2005).
When a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be
impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, the
only practical alternative being to go against the distributor of the copying device for
secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement.

ld.

2 F. Supp. 728. 733 (E.D. Penn. 1930).
2' Rupp & Wittgenfeld Co. v. Elliott. 131 F. 730, 732 (6th Cir. 1904).
27
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The goal of Congress in enacting the contributory infringement and inducement sections of
the Patent Act of 1952 was to codify the existing common law of contributory infringement. 9
The 1952 Patent Act divided the concept of contributory infringement into active inducement,
§ 271(b), and contributory infringement, § 271 (c). 30 Section 271 (c) codified the traditional type of
contributory infringement and required proof that the defendant knew his activity would cause
infringement] 1 Section 271(b) codified the prohibition against all other types of behavior that had
constituted contributory infringement prior to the Act, but left the question of required knowledge
and intent open. 2 It was into this void that the Federal Circuit stepped in 1990.

II. THE CONFLICT

A. General Intent: Hewlett-PackardCo. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.
In the early 1980s, Bausch & Lomb, Inc. ("B&L") sold graphing tools called plotters through
its Houston Instruments division. 3 In September 1985, B&L entered into an agreement to sell the
Houston Instruments division to Ametek, Inc. ("Ametek").' 4 The purchase agreement contained a
clause indemnifying Ametek against liability for infringing LaBarre U.S. Patent No. 4,384,298
(the " '298 patent"), relating to X-Y plotters and assigned to Hewlett-Packard Co. ("HP"). 35 In
May of 1986, HP brought suit against B&L for direct infringement of the '298 patent for the
period prior to the sale of Houston Instruments and inducement of infringement of the '298 patent
for the period subsequent to the sale.' 6 The district court found claim 1 of the '298 patent valid
and held that the patent was directly infringed by B&L for the period prior to the sale. 3 However,
the court held that B&L did not induce infringement thereafter.3 8 B&L appealed the judgment
holding the '298 patent valid and infringed, and HP cross-appealed on the inducement issue. The
Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of validity and direct infringement.39
Before reaching the inducement issue, the Federal Circuit discussed the development of the
law of inducement and contributory infringement. 40 Acknowledging the frequent confusion
between the two types of indirect infringement, the court attempted to clarify the distinction
between them. 41 As discussed above, prior to the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952,
infringement was a creature of common law divided between direct infringement and contributory
infringement.42 The court noted that the plaintiff had to show intent to cause infringement to
succeed on a contributory infringement claim, but that many courts presumed intent where the
29

See Hewlett-PackardCo., 909 F.2d at 1469.

30 Id.
32

I3
id.
Id.

33 Id.at 1467
34 id.
35 Id.at 1465, 1467.
36 Id. at 1467.
37 id.
38 Id.
39 Id.

40 See

id. at 1469.
41 See id at 1468 69 (discussing and clarifying the differences between the two codified types of indirect
infringement).
42 See id.
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component had no substantial non-infringing use. 43 Further, the court observed that Congress, in
codifying and dividing contributory infringement, had left the courts
to determine the level of
44
intent required to prove inducement under § 271(b) of the Patent Act.
Therefore, the only remaining task for the Federal Circuit was to define the level of
knowledge or intent necessary to find active inducement. The court observed that the legislative
history of the Act indicated that there was no intent to change the scope of contributory
infringement and held that general intent was the proper standard for inducement:
In view of the very definition of "active inducement" in pre-1952 case law and the fact
that § 271(b) was intended as merely a codification of pre-1952 law, we are of the
opinion that proof of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement is
a necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement.45
The court found that proof of such intent was missing in this case because B&L was only
interested in selling Houston Instruments and had no interest in Ametek's plans for making or
selling the plotters.46

B. Specific Intent: Manville Sales Corp.v. ParamountSystems, Inc.
Three months after articulating the inducement intent standard in Hewlett-Packard, the
Federal Circuit addressed a case in which this standard would be critical to the fate of two
individual defendants facing personal liability for allegedly inducing infringement. In Manville
Sales Corp. v. ParamountSystems, Inc., Manville Sales Corp. ("Manville") brought suit against
Paramount Systems, Inc. ("Paramount") alleging infringement of a patent directed to a lighting
assembly.47 Manville later added as defendants Robert S. Butterworth and Anthony J. DiSimone,
corporate officers of Paramount, alleging these individuals directly infringed the patent and
induced infringement.48
In the course of developing and marketing the lighting assembly, Manville's research
director sent confidential drawings of the device to various state officials to request permission to
use the new design within these states.49 Mr. DiSimone, Paramount's corporate secretary,5
obtained a copy of one of the drawings submitted to the Florida Department of Transportation.
He then forwarded the drawing to Mr. Butterworth, Paramount's president, who gave the drawing
to a Paramount designer to aid in the design of lighting assembly products later sold by
Paramount.51
The case reached the Federal Circuit after the district court held Paramount liable for direct
infringement, and DiSimone and Butterworth personally liable for both direct and induced

41
44

45
46

Id. at 1469.
See id.
id.
Id. at 1469-70.

917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that Manville filed suit against Paramount alleging
infringement of patent number 3,847.333).
47

48

id.

Id. at 547-49.
51 Id. at 549.
49

51 id.
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infringement.5 2 After affirming the district court's findings as to validity, enforceability, and
Paramount's infringement liability, the court turned to the personal liability of the corporate
officers. 5' The court first addressed the officers' personal liability for direct infringement.54 The
Federal Circuit stated that to hold corporate officers personally liable for direct infringement,
precedent required "evidence to justify piercing the corporate veil."55 In general, courts are guided
by principles of equity and may pierce the corporate veil to prevent "fraud, illegality, injustice, a
contravention of public policy, or prevent the corporation from shielding someone from criminal
liability. 56 The court noted that it could justify piercing the corporate veil where the evidence
showed the corporation was merely the alter ego of its officers. 5 Specific intent to escape liability
for a specific tort might also warrant such equitable action by a court.58 Thus, the Federal Circuit
concluded that, in the absence of unusual circumstances, courts should recognize and uphold the
59
corporate entity.
The court examined the record to determine whether such evidence was present, 60 but found
no such unusual circumstances in the record. 61 Although the district court based its direct
infringement decision on the officers' actions that led to the copying of the Manville design, the
Federal Circuit found these acts were within the scope of the officers' corporate duties, and
therefore, were entitled to the protection of the corporate veil. 62 Furthermore, the evidence failed
to show the officers were aware of the patent prior to commencement of the lawsuit, and the
record demonstrated that Paramount pursued its subsequent activity in good faith reliance on
advice of counsel. 63 The Federal Circuit also noted that the district court made no finding that
Paramount was the alter ego of the officers.64 Clearly troubled by this record, the Federal Circuit
held that the district court abused its equitable powers and reversed as to the personal liability of
the officers for direct infringement:
Based on the district court's own underlying findings, and the record presented to us,
we conclude that the court's determination that Butterworth and DiSimone were
personally liable, because it was based on piercing the corporate veil, was an abuse of
its equitable powers. The district court's findings establish that the officers were acting
within the scope of their employment. The court's findings preclude any inference that
Butterworth and DiSimone were attempting to avoid liability under the protection of the
corporate veil. Accordingly, we reverse as to the liability of the officers in their
individual capacities with respect to infringement under section 271 (a).65
This portion of the decision turned on the corporate law protection of the corporate veil
rather than patent law.
52 id.
53 Id. at 552.
54 Id. at 552 53.
55 Id. at 552 (citing A. Stucki Co. v. Worthington Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 593. 596 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
56 Id. at 552 (quoting Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267. 272 (3d Cir. 1967)).
57 Id. (citing Zubik, 384 F.2d at 271 72).
58 id.
59 id.
60

Id. at 552 53.

61

See id. at 552-53.

64

id.
Id. at 553.
id.

65

id.

62
63
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The Federal Circuit next turned to personal liability for inducement. The court again began
the analysis by examining its corporate law precedent with respect to inducement. 66 The Federal
Circuit stated its jurisprudence holds corporate officers who actively induce infringing acts by
their corporation may be personally liable, regardless of whether the circumstances would permit
piercing the corporate veil. 67 Obviously, the corporate veil would not protect DiSimone and
Butterworth from inducement liability.
The court then examined the knowledge and intent requirements for inducement, and found
that an alleged infringer must have knowingly induced infringement. 68 However, in examining the
intent standard, the Federal Circuit ran head-on into Hewlett-Packard and a curious thing
happened - the court cited Hewlett-Packardand another case, Water Technologies v. Calco, Ltd.,
for a new specific intent standard not contained in either of those cases. 69 Specifically, the court
stated:
[t]he alleged infringer must be shown, however, to have knowingly induced
infringement.[ 7 0] It must be established that the defendant possessed specific intent to
encourage another's infringement and not merely that the defendant had knowledge of
the acts alleged to constitute inducement. The plaintiff has the burden of showing that
the alleged infringer's actions induced infringing acts and that he knew or should have
known his actions would induce actual infringements.71
For a Federal Circuit panel troubled by the prospect of exposing the corporate officers to
personal liability for inducement on these facts, the problem was clear: under the HewlettPackardstandard, the officers' activities would meet the requisite level of intent for inducement.
The record amply supported a finding that DiSimone and Butterworth intended to cause the acts
that constituted infringement. 72 Specifically, between the two of them, they had discovered
Manville's design drawing and submitted it to Paramount's designers for them to work with in
developing the ultimately infringing lighting assembly. 73 However, the record could not support a
finding that DiSimone and Butterworth intended to cause actual infringement because they were
unaware of the patent before the lawsuit was filed, and they relied on an opinion of counsel
thereafter.74 For that reason, the Federal Circuit's solution was to raise the intent bar; thereby
requiring that an alleged inducer must intend to cause actual infringement. In light of this new
standard, the court was able to reverse as to personal liability of the officers for inducing
infringement. 76
In support of the new intent standard, the Manville Sales court cited three cases, none of
which provided precedent for the universal application of a stricter intent requirement.7 The first,
66

id.

67

68

Id. (citing Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1578-79 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
Id. (citing Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).

69

id.
Water Techs Corp., 850 F.2d at 668.

71 Manville, 917 F.2d at 553 (emphasis in original).
72 See id. at 549.
73

id.
74 Id. at 553 54.
75 id.
76

See id.

77 Id. at 553. See generally Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964);

Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468-69 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Water Techs. Corp. v.
Calco. Ltd., 850 F.2d 660. 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

[6:198 2007]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., a Supreme Court case, did not
address inducement at all, but was a post-1952 Patent Act contributory infringement case. 71 Of
the two remaining inducement cases, one was Hewlett-Packard, which established the lower
general intent standard. 79 The other was Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, a case in which the
Federal Circuit articulated a knowledge requirement, not a specific intent standard, for inducement
liability. '0
In Water Technologies, the Federal Circuit held that an individual inventor-licensor of resins,
and a consultant to defendant Calco Ltd. ("Calco") were liable for inducing infringement for
providing infringing resin formulas to Calco, helping Calco make the infringing resins, and
preparing consumer use instructions for the infringing resins.8 1 The court affirmed the finding of
inducement because there was no "clear evidence of lack of intent," and therefore, the district
court did not err in inferring intent to induce from the circumstantial evidence. 2 Although the
Federal Circuit mentioned that there is a knowledge requirement for inducement liability, it is not
the equivalent of intent. 8 ' Thus, the Manville Sales court's citation to Water Technologies does
not justify the creation of a universal specific intent standard for all accused inducers.
Manville Sales, therefore, appeared to create a conflict as to which level of intent was
required to prove liability for inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). This doubt lasted
for over sixteen years, until the Federal Circuit, responding to internal and external calls to resolve
this "lack of clarity," handed down the DSU Medical opinion. 84

III. "RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTING PRECEDENT"

A. DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co.
In DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., DSU Medical Corporation and Medisystems Corporation
(collectively "DSU") sued JMS Company, Ltd. ("JMS"), JMS North America ("JMSNA") and
ITL Corporation Pty, Ltd. ("ITL") for direct infringement, contributory infringement, and

inducing infringement of two patents directed to a needle assembly with a guard designed to
reduce the risk of accidental needle-stick injuries.8 5 The allegedly infringing device, sold under

78 377 U.S. 476. 488 (1964) (stating that section 271(c) requires a showing that an alleged contributory
infringer knew that its acts would be infringing).
79 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 69 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
8' 850 F.2d 660. 668-69 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
81 Id.
82
83
84

id.
Id.
See Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1364 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting

MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("It should be noted that 'there is a lack
of clarity concerning whether the required intent must be merely to induce the specific acts [of infringement] or
additionally to cause an infringement'); see also Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368. 1377
(Fed. Cir. 2005) ("This court recently recognized a 'lack of clarity' about the appropriate level of intent for
inducement. Specifically, this court has historically required either a general or a specific level of intent to induce
infringement.") (internal citations omitted); see, e.g.. Michael N. Rader. Toward a Coherent Law of Inducement to
Infringe: Why the FederalCircuitShould Adopt the Hewlett-PackardStandardforIntent Under § 271(b), 10 FED.
CIR. B.J. 299, 320-22 (2000).
15 DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co.. 471 F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
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the brand name Platypus, was a configured plastic needle guard.8 6 The Platypus resembles an
open clam shell prior to use, and the two halves of the shell close around a needle assembly to
form a guard during use.8 7 ITL manufactured the allegedly infringing needle guards in Malaysia
and Singapore and sold them to JMS. 88 JMS bought Platypus devices in the open shell
configuration and generally closed the guards around needle assemblies before distributing them
to customers. 89 DSU alleged that the Platypus directly infringed its patents and that JMS and ITL
contributed to and induced each other's infringement.9"
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants finding non-infringement on
many of the asserted claims, but held that the Platypus product infringed several claims as a matter
of law. 91 The jury returned verdicts holding JMS and JMSNA liable for direct and contributory
infringement and found JMS liable for inducing JMSNA's direct infringement. 92 However, the
jury found ITL not liable for direct infringement, contributory infringement, or inducing
infringement. 93 The district court subsequently
denied DSU's motion for a new trial on
94
contributory infringement and inducement.
On appeal, DSU argued that the jury instruction on inducement was improper. 95
Specifically, DSU asserted that the state of mind necessary for a finding of inducement was
inaccurately stated in the instructions, which required that the inducer possess specific intent to
encourage another's infringement. 96 The disputed jury instruction read, in relevant part:
In order to induce infringement, there must first be an act of direct infringement and
proof that the defendant knowingly induced infringement with the intent to encourage
the infringement. The defendant must have intended to cause the acts that constitute
the direct infringement and must have known or should have known than [sic] its action
would cause direct infringement.97
DSU argued that the proper intent standard is that the inducer
need only intend to cause the acts
98
constituting infringement, as stated in Hewlett-Packard.
The Federal Circuit first observed the jury charge followed the Manville Sales standard and
reiterated that section 271(b) provides no guidance as to the level of intent required to prove
inducement. 99 Then the court turned to copyright law, and in a rather cursory analysis based
primarily on Grokster, the court held the proper standard for proving inducement liability is
specific intent as set forth in Manville Sales. l ° ° The court quoted a passage from the Grokster
decision that states little more than the fundamental principles of the inducement doctrine and the
rationale for charging liability to a party that promotes the infringing use of a product having both
Id. at 1298.
id.
88 Id. at 1299.
86

87

89 Id.

9o Id.
9' Id. at 1300-02.
92 Id. at 1302
93 id.
94 id.

95 Id. at 1304.
96Id. at 1305.
97 id.
98 id.
99 Id. at 1306.
100 Id.
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lawful and unlawful uses.10 1 In the court's view, Grokster's requirement of "purposeful, culpable
expression and conduct" to impose inducement liability provided the "validation" it needed to
resolve the conflict in favor of Manville Sales:
Grokster, thus, validates this court's articulation of the state of mind requirement for
inducement .... In Manville, this court held that the "alleged infringer must be shown
...to have knowingly induced infringement,"..,
not merely knowingly induced the
10 2
acts that constitute direct infringement.

The court even read the Grokster decision as an affirmative repudiation of Hewlett-Packard:
Although this court stated "that proof of actual intent to cause the acts which
constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active
inducement," . . . Grokster has clarified that the intent requirement for
inducement requires more than just intent to cause the acts that produce direct
infringement. Beyond that threshold knowledge, the inducer must have an
affirmative intent to cause direct infringement ... . Accordingly, inducement
requires evidence of culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another's
infringement, not merely that the inducer had knowledge of the direct infringer's
activities. 03
Based on the newly-clarified intent standard, the court upheld the district court's jury
instructions. Furthermore, the court affirmed the denial of defendants' motion for a new trial
because the jury verdict was reasonable in light of defendants' reliance on opinions of counsel and
testimony that ITL did not intend to infringe the asserted patents. 10 4 However, the opinion made
no mention of the implications of adopting the specific intent standard.
In a brief concurrence, Chief Judge Michel and Judge Mayer expressed their view that there
was no actual conflict between Hewlett-Packardand Manville Sales and, thus, it was unnecessary
for an en banc review of the intent issue.l°5 Had Hewlett-Packardheld that "proof of actual intent
to cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary and sufficient prerequisite to
finding active inducement," then Hewlett-Packardwould have conflicted with Manville Sales.10 6
The concurring judges would have simply held that the district court properly rejected DSU's

ioSee id.
The rule on inducement of infringement as developed in the early cases is no different
today. Evidence of 'active steps . ..taken to encourage direct infringement,' such as
advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show an
affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe, and a showing that infringement was
encouraged overcomes the law's reluctance to find liability when a defendant merely sells a
commercial product suitable for some lawful use."
Id.(citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios. Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913. 936 (2005)).
102 Id.(internal citations omitted).
3 Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,
909 F.2d 1464. 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
104 See id.at 1307.
105 Id. at 1311 (Michel and Mayer, JJ.. concurring).
106 See id. (Michel and Mayer. JJ., concurring) (emphasis added).
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proffered10 jury instructions because DSU misunderstood Hewlett-Packard and incorrectly stated
the law. 7

B. Analysis of the En Banc Opinion

1. Manville Sales andIts ProgenyDo Not Support the En Banc Holding
The Federal Circuit followed Manville Sales in adopting the specific intent standard.1" 8
However, Manville Sales does not support a universal application of the specific intent standard,
and a brief survey of its progeny demonstrates that this higher standard may appropriately be
limited to corporate officer inducement liability.10 9 As discussed above, Manville Sales was
decided on its basic equities. 110 Application of the general intent standard would have exposed
corporate officers to personal liability for inducing infringement for simply performing acts within
the scope of their corporate duties. To avoid this inequitable result, the Manville Sales panel used
a specific intent standard. "' Accordingly, there is a compelling
argument that its holding might
112
only apply to inducement liability of corporate officers.
Moreover, in subsequent decisions, the Federal Circuit has recognized that the specific intent
standard should apply to corporate officers accused of inducing infringement. For example, in
Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed a district court ruling
that Dwayne Holden, the president, chief executive officer, and principal shareholder of Custom
Metalcrafl, Inc. ("Custom"), was personally liable for inducement.113 The Hoover Group
("Hoover") alleged that Holden induced the infringement of two patents, relating to storage tanks
for holding and transporting liquids, because he controlled Custom and made all of its major
business decisions. 114 Similar to the Manville Sales court, the panel in Hoover Group noted that
the record did not support piercing the corporate veil, and in fact, the district court had not done
so. 115 Furthermore, the record showed that Holden
promptly consulted with counsel upon learning
116
of Hoover's assertions of patent infringement.
When the court turned to the intent question, it held that mere knowledge of the allegedly
infringing acts did not demonstrate sufficient culpability to hold a corporate officer personally
liable for inducement. 117 The court cited both Manville Sales and Hewlett-Packard,but rejected
application of the Hewlett-Packardstandard to these facts, stating:

id.
See id. at 1304 (discussing the holding of Manville Sales).
109See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 552 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
""G
Id. at 553.
107
'"

..Id. at 554.

112

This interpretation provides an additional basis for concluding that there was no actual conflict between

Hewlett-Packard and Manville Sales. See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293. 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Michel and Mayer. JJ., concurring).
113 84 F.3d 1408, 1412 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
14 Id. at 1410.
115

116
"7

Id. at 1412.
Id.
See id. (holding that an officer must "actively and knowingly assist with the corporation's infringement"

in order to be held personally liable).
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It is an insufficient basis for personal liability that the officer had knowledge of the acts
alleged to constitute infringement ....
In sum, unless the corporate structure is a sham,
as is not here asserted, personal liability for inducement to infringe is not automatic but
must be supported by personal culpability.118
In another case, Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Great Plains Chemical Co., the Federal Circuit also
adopted the Manville Sales standard as a rule applicable to corporate officers.'9 The Micro
Chemical court affirmed a grant of summary judgment absolving the president of defendant
corporation of personal liability for inducing the corporation's infringing activity. 20 The
president had taken reasonable steps to avoid infringement, including seeking advice of counsel
and relying on that advice in redesigning the accused machines. 12' In affirming, the court cited
Manville Sales and held, "[o]fficers of an allegedly infringing corporation can be held personally
liable for actively inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) only if they 'knew or should
have known [their] actions would induce actual infringements."' 122
Similarly, in Ferguson-Beauregard/LogicControls v. Mega Systems, LLC, the Federal
Circuit affirmed a district court determination that the president-majority owner of Mega Systems
was not liable for inducement, citing Micro Chemical and Manville Sales as controlling
precedent. 3 The appellant relied on Hewlett-Packard and argued the proper standard for
inducement liability was that the officer only be aware of his activities, not necessarily that he be
aware that the activities constitute infringement.124 The court rejected this argument, stating that
the application of the "less stringent test" is "contradicted by our precedent."'125 The Federal
Circuit first cited Micro Chemical for its articulation of inducement law with respect to corporate
officers and then quoted the specific intent standard from Manville Sales and affirmed the finding
of no personal liability for inducement stating, "Ferguson's position is untenable based on
Manville Sales, which makes clear that 'it must be established that the defendant possessed
specific intent to encourage another's infringement and
not merely that the defendant had
' 126
knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute infringement."
Ferguson-Beauregardis significant in that the court affirmatively rejected the application of
the Hewlett-Packardstandard to corporate officers. 127 Rather, the court joined the trend of Federal
Circuit decisions following Manville Sales and applied the specific intent standard to corporate
officers accused of inducement. 28 The court interpreted Manville Sales and selectively applied
the specific intent standard to cases in which corporate officers stand accused of inducement; this
provides support for the notion that the factual scenario in Manville Sales is the proper context for
application of this intent standard. 129 Accordingly, there is some doubt that the Federal Circuit's
"' Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Manville Sales Corp., v. Paramount Sys.. Inc., 917 F.2d 944, 553
(Fed. Cir. 1990); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464. 1468-69 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
119 194 F.3d 1250, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
120

id.

121 See

id. at 1257.
Id. at 1261 (internal citations omitted) (citing Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544,
553 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
123350 F.3d 1327, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
122

124

125
126

Id.
id.

Id. (quoting Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 553).

Id.
id.
129 id.

127

128
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own precedent supports universal application of the specific intent standard adopted in DSU
Medical.1'

2. Grokster Does Not Support Adopting the Specific Intent Standardand Is a ProblematicSource
for Resolving the Issue of Intent in Inducement
The en banc section of DSU Medical rested primarily on the Supreme Court's Grokster
opinion. 131 However, it is far from clear that Grokster endorses a specific intent requirement for
inducing infringement under section 271(b). In Grokster, the Supreme Court borrowed patent
law's inducement doctrine without comment as to which level of intent should apply, in part
because the level of intent was not critical to make a determination of liability.132 Moreover,
Grokster is an inappropriate source for divining the proper intent standard for patent law
inducement because copyright law lacks a significant opinion of counsel defense.
Grokster stands for the proposition that a party who introduces an article having both
infringing and non-infringing uses into the stream of commerce may not rely on the article's noninfringing uses as a shield from liability if that party acts to promote the article's infringing
uses. 13 ' In other words, by adopting patent law's inducement rule, the Supreme Court merely held
that contributory infringement's staple article of commerce rule need not be the end of the indirect
infringement inquiry in copyright law. In particular, the staple article doctrine adopted by the
Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. does not foreclose a finding of
intent from other factors. 134 The Court stated that with the inducement doctrine, also available for
copyright, courts may look beyond the article itself to evidence of intent, which is separate and
apart from the characteristics or uses of the article, specifically:
Sony's rule limits imputing culpable intent as a matter of law from the characteristics or
uses of a distributed product. But nothing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of
intent if there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of faultbased liability derived from the common law .... Thus, where evidence goes beyond a
product's characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and
shows statements or actions directed to promoting infringement, Sony's staple-article
rule will not preclude liability.135

130 It is worth noting that. while Judge Rader authored the DSU Medical en banc opinion holding
that the
specific intent standard applies to all inducement cases, he was part of a prior traditional panel that issued a per
curiam opinion holding that the general intent standard should apply to the facts of that case. See Moba, B.V. v.
Diamond Automation, Inc.. 325 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("in this case, the only intent
required of [alleged inducer] FPS is the intent to cause the acts that constitute infringement").
13' DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1303, 1305-06 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
132 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913. 934 (2005).
133 See id at 935 ("[W]here evidence goes beyond a product's characteristics or the knowledge that it may be

put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting infringement. Sony's staple-article rule
will not preclude liability").
134 464 U.S. 417, 426 (1984) ("Selling a staple article of commerce ... technically contributes to any
infringing use subsequently made thereof, but this kind of 'contribution.' if deemed sufficient as a basis for liability,
would expand the theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judicial management"). See also Grokster, 545
U.S. at 934 (analyzing the standard set forth by Sony for addressing evidence of intent in contributory
infringement).
135 Grokster,545 U.S. at 934.
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Just as the Court had borrowed contributory infringement from patent law some twenty years
earlier in Sony, this time it borrowed inducement. Accordingly, the Court held that a party who
sells a device with non-infringing uses, yet demonstrates through affirmative steps that it intends
to promote infringing uses, is liable for inducing copyright infringement. 136
Thus, it was the availability of extrinsic indicia of intent that prompted the Supreme Court to
adopt inducement liability for copyright law, and the Court declined to borrow a particular level of
intent from patent law inducement. 137 While the Court found defendants possessed the requisite
state of mind to be held liable for inducement based on a record "replete with other evidence"
showing that they "acted with the purpose to cause copyright violations," nothing in the Grokster
decision demonstrates an express preference for either the general or the specific intent standard.
138 Indeed, the facts did not require the Court to select an intent standard because defendants'
conduct would have subjected them to inducement liability under either standard. The evidence
showed the defendants targeted former users of the known infringer Napster; this persuaded the
Court that defendants intended to cause actual copyright infringement, which
necessarily includes
139
the lesser general intent to cause acts constituting copyright infringement.
On this score, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court did not once cite to Hewlett-Packard
or Manville Sales throughout its substantial discussion of patent law's inducement doctrine. One
could infer that such a notable absence means the Court did not wish to rule directly on the
apparent conflict between the two decisions. Indeed, the only Federal Circuit precedent cited in
Grokster is Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., which was decided two years before
Hewlett-Packardand Manville Sales, and, except for one opinion by the District Court for the
Western District of Michigan, all of the cited authority was decided before the Hewlett-PackardManville Sales conflict emerged.1 4 If the Court had wished to weigh in on the proper intent
standard for inducement, it certainly would have at least mentioned the two leading decisions on
the issue or subsequent opinions that addressed the conflict.
The only Federal Circuit decision cited by the Supreme Court was Water Technologies,
which does not support application of the specific intent standard. As discussed above, in Water
Technologies the court affirmed the finding of inducement because there was no "clear evidence
of lack of intent," so the district court did not err in inferring intent to induce from the
circumstantial evidence. 41 There the court articulated a knowledge component, which is not the
equivalent of intent. Thus, Grokster's citation to Water Technologies does not demonstrate the
Supreme Court's "validation" of a universal specific intent standard for inducing infringement.
In addition to being misplaced, the Federal Circuit's heavy reliance on Grokster is highly
problematic because of a critical distinction between the defenses available in copyright law and
patent law. In patent law, an alleged infringer accused of willful infringement will often rely on
an opinion of counsel to rebut the willfulness charge. 142 The analogous defense is extremely rare
136

Id. at 919 ("[0]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as

shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third parties").
137 See id.at 936 37.
131 See id. at 923, 938.
139See
140

id. at 937-38.

See id. at 936 (citing Haworth Inc. v. Herman Miller Inc., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 1090 (W.D. Mich. 1994)

for the proposition that "evidence that defendant 'demonste[d] and recommend[ed] infringing configurations' of its
product could support inducement liability").
141 Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
42 Wilson L. White. Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege as a Patent Sword and Shield: The Role of the
Adverse Inference Rule in the Efficiency of the Patent System. 84 N.C.L. Rev. 1049, 1065 (2006) ("The potentially
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in the copyright context. Because of this distinction, the common law of copyright inducement as
articulated in Grokster is not an appropriate source for resolving the role of intent in patent law
inducement. Thus, the requirement of specific intent in patent law inducement disproportionately
raises the possibility of an opinion of counsel defense and all of the issues associated with it, the
implications of which are discussed in Section IV.

IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DSU MEDICAL: THE NEW IMPORTANCE OF THE OPINION OF COUNSEL

A. The Opinion of Counsel Will Now Be a ConsistentlyPotent Defense to Inducement

Notably absent from the DSU Medical court's en banc analysis is any mention of the
implications of universal application of the specific intent standard for inducement. In this
author's mind, the most significant implication is the importance of the opinion of counsel defense
to inducement. Before DSU Medical, practitioners could not be sure which intent standard would
be employed by the courts, thus there was doubt as to the effectiveness of the opinion of counsel

defense to a charge of inducing infringement, and often it would not be raised. As discussed in
this section, the DSU Medical decision eliminated any such doubt, and the opinion of counsel is
now a potent, if not complete, defense to inducement.
It is well-established that an opinion of counsel provides a defense to a charge of willful
patent infringement. 143 However, it is less well-established, and has been somewhat controversial,
that an opinion of counsel can be a critical factor in establishing a defense to a charge of inducing
infringement. 144 While many courts, including the Federal Circuit, have found an opinion of
counsel to be relevant exculpatory evidence negating intent, 14 the holding in DSU Medical
devastating financial consequences of the treble damages for willful infringement very often made the decision to
obtain and disclose opinion of counsel 'unavoidable.').
13 See, e.g.. Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co.. 60 F.3d 785. 793-94 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (affirming a finding that
defendant was not liable for willful infringement based on reasonable reliance on an opinion of counsel); Ortho
Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944-45 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
144 See Symbol Tech, Inc. v. Metrologic Instruments, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1390. 1405 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding
that advice of counsel is applicable toward finding willful infringement, but that "[a]dvice of counsel has no
relevance here in determining whether [defendant] induced infringement under § 271 (b)"); see also Recent Case:
Patent Law Active Inducement of Infringement District Court Holds That Inducement Liability Requires Proof
of Intent To Induce Violation of the Law: Amersham PharmaciaBiotech, Inc. v. Perkin-ElmerCorp., 115 HARv. L.
REV. 1246, 1249 (2002) ("[T]he notion that a defendant may escape liability under 27 1(b) merely by obtaining a
plausible noninfringement opinion remains highly controversial among both courts and commentators."); Michael
N. Rader, Toward a Coherent Law of Inducement to Infringe: Why the Federal Circuit Should Adopt the HewlettPackard Standardfor Intent Under §271(b), 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 299, 330 (2000) ("[E]nabling alleged inducers to
escape liability by obtaining a noninfringement opinion from counsel, as suggested in Manville Sales, would result
in highly uneven patent protection across different industries.").
145 See Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming
summary judgment of no inducement liability for defendant corporate officer because "[a]mong other things,
[defendant] sought and relied on the advice of counsel in redesigning the accused machines"): Manville Sales Corp.
v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 54 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (reversing the district court's determination that
defendants were liable for inducement because defendants were unaware of the asserted patent until suit was filed
and "subsequent infringing acts continued upon [defendant's] 'good faith belief,' based on advice of counsel, that
[the accused] product did not infringe"); Amersham Pharmacia Biotech, Inc. v. The Perkin-Elmer Corp., 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18751, at *16-17 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2000) (denying patentee's motion for summary judgment on
inducement because defendant offered evidence that it had been "operating under a good faith belief, based on an
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cements the opinion of counsel as at least a substantial element of an inducement defense and
perhaps a complete defense for the accused inducer.
In an opinion of counsel, a patent attorney analyzes patents that may present obstacles to the
production, marketing and sale of a product and usually concludes that the manufacturer or seller
has reasonable non-infringement, invalidity and/or unenforceability defenses should those patents
be asserted in an infringement action. Such opinions are generally obtained to rebut a potential
charge of willful infringement, which, if proved, gives rise to a trebling of damages under 35
U.S.C. § 284.146 A competent opinion of counsel generally provides a defense to a charge of
willful infringement because consultation with patent counsel and reasonable reliance on an
opinion discharges the alleged infringer's duty of care to avoid infringement of known patents.147
Thus, an accused infringer who relies on a competent opinion of counsel analyzing the patents-insuit has a reasonable belief that the accused products do not infringe those patents.
To reiterate, under DSU Medical, to prove a defendant liable for inducing infringement, the
148
patentee must show that defendant has "an affirmative intent to cause direct infringement.,
This requires that the alleged infringer possess "specific intent to encourage another's
infringement." 149 That is, in the words of Manville Sales, "he knew or should have known that his
actions would induce actual infringements." 150 The key to this standard is a culpable state of
mind, something akin to the mens rea requirement in criminal law, and the procurement of an
opinion of counsel almost invariably negates such a state of mind. If the opinion is competent and
reasonably concludes that the accused product does not infringe, or the asserted patents are invalid
or unenforceable, the alleged inducer clearly does not possess the intent to cause actual
infringements. Armed with such an opinion, an accused inducer believes that the analysis in the
opinion provides him with reasonable arguments against infringement liability and therefore lacks
the requisite mens rea for specific intent.
It should be noted that an opinion of counsel would not provide a defense under the lower
general intent standard articulated in Hewlett-Packard, which required only that the alleged
inducer intended to cause the acts constituting infringement. 151 Under that standard, an opinion of
counsel would be immaterial because it pertains to the issue of actual infringement on a technical
level, not the acts constituting infringement such as manufacturing and sales, which are still

opinion of counsel, that its products do not induce infringement"); but see Symbol Tech, 771 F. Supp. at 1405
(finding under general intent standard that "[a]dvice of counsel has no relevance here in determining whether
[defendant] induced infringement under § 271 (b)").
146 See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (noting the determination of willful infringement turns on whether the potential infringer had notice and
failed to exercise due care by not obtaining legal advice from counsel before continuing alleged infringement
activities); See also 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) ("[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed").
147See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345-46 ("[T]here continues to be 'an affirmative duty of due care to

avoid infringement of the known patent rights of others'") (quoting L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988
F.2d 1117, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Ortho Pharm. Corp., 959 F.2d at 944 ("[C]ounsel's opinion must be
thorough enough, as combined with other factors, to instill a belief in the infringer that a court might reasonably
hold the patent is invalid, not infringed, or unenforceable").

DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. (quoting Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. V. Chemque. Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1304-05 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
150Id.(quoting Manville Sales Corp.v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
5' Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("[P]roof of actual
intent to cause acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement.").
14'
14

[6:198 2007]

Federal Circuit's Inducement Conflict Resolution

intended by the inducer. 15 2 Therefore, had DSU Medical adopted the Hewlett-Packardstandard,
the opinion of counsel would have been eliminated as a factor in defending against inducement
liability. As long as the perceived conflict between the two standards existed, the opinion of
counsel remained only a potential defense, and its effectiveness depended on which standard the
court chose to follow. But the DSU Medical holding now puts the opinion of counsel defense to
inducement squarely in play and elevates it to possibly the single most important factor in
defending against inducement liability.

B. Reliance on an Opinion of Counselfor an Inducement Defense Will Likely Trigger a
Waiver ofPrivilege and Work-ProductImmunity
A significant issue that practitioners and the courts may now have to grapple with is whether
reliance on an opinion of counsel solely as an inducement defense should trigger the same waiver
of the attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity with regard to certain subject matter as
does reliance on an opinion in defense of a willfulness claim. This is particularly important in
view of the wide scope of this waiver, which now extends to all attorney-client communications
relating to the subject matter of the opinion, and even to documents that refer to attorney-client
communications, but are not themselves communications between attorney and client. 113
At least one court has addressed this issue and held that the defendant waived the attorneyclient privilege with respect to the subject matter of opinions relied upon for an inducement
defense.154 In SEB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., defendants asserted that reasonable reliance on
counsel's non-infringement opinion letters precluded a finding of the requisite intent to induce
infringement and thus, provided a complete defense to liability.155 During discovery, defendants
produced two of the opinion letters at issue, but withheld production of a third.156 The court held
that since defendants claim their "reliance on opinions from counsel shield[s] them from liability
under § 271(b)" they have waived the attorney-client privilege
with respect to the opinions and
15 7
must produce the third opinion letter and related materials.
It is likely that other courts would also find that the waiver applies with equal force to
inducement opinions because the same rationale for waiver in the willfulness context exists in the
inducement scenario. In each case, the accused infringer relies on the opinion, and therefore, puts
the opinion in issue on the matter of his state of mind with respect to infringement. Specifically,
the accused infringer's defense depends on his state of mind, which in turn hinges on the subject
matter of the opinion. For the alleged willful infringer to prove that he exercised his duty of care
to avoid infringing the patents-in-suit, he must show that his reliance on the opinion of counsel
was reasonable. 158 Therefore, the opinion must be competent, and a determination of competence
requires that the opinion be produced and examined.15 9 Furthermore, a complete determination of

152

See, e.g., Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Metrologic Instruments, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1390, 1405 (D.N.J. 1991)

(finding, under the general intent standard, that "[a]dvice of counsel has no relevance ...in determining whether
[defendant] induced infringement under § 27 1(b)").
153 See In re EchoStar Comm. Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1304
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
154 SEB, S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 336, 348-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
155 Id. at 344.
151 Id. at 348.
15'7
Id.at 348-49.
151 Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936. 944 (Fed. Cir 1992).
151 See In re EchoStar Comm. Corp.. 448 F.3d 1294. 1303 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
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defendant's state of mind requires that all communications to the client pertaining to the subject
matter of the opinions be produced. 160
However, the objective nature of the willfulness inquiry 16 1 may provide a slim basis for the
defendant, relying on an opinion solely for an inducement defense, to draw a distinction that may
persuade a court to reach a different result on the waiver issue. Specifically, the alleged inducer
could argue that the inquiry into the required state of mind for specific intent to induce infringing
acts differs from the reasonable reliance inquiry for willfulness because it is subjective. Specific
intent, the argument goes, requires a guilty state of mind, like the mens rea requirement in
criminal law. Therefore, the dispositive issue is the inducer's subjective intent, reasonable or not.
Under a subjective standard for intent, it should be immaterial whether the reliance on the opinion
was reasonable or unreasonable, and the opinion does not need to be examined for competence,
and therefore, does not need to be produced. This argument provides the inducement defendant
with at least some basis for distinguishing inducement and fighting the waiver.
The argument is unlikely to be widely successful, however, because it does not address the
basic fairness considerations underpinning the waiver rule. The rationale for the waiver rule is
that it prevents the unfairness that would result if the accused infringer were permitted to rely on
self-serving documents while withholding unfavorable or damaging information. 162 But it also
puts the defendant in the difficult position of choosing between providing the best defense against
willfulness and suffering the consequences of the broad waiver, or severely handicapping the
willfulness defense and maintaining the protection of the attorney-client privilege and workproduct immunity on the other.
A common remedy to relieve this burden and alleviate the risk of waiver is to bifurcate the
patent infringement trial into a first phase on liability issues and a second phase, if necessary, on
willfulness and damages. 163 This arrangement permits the defendant to delay the decision to rely
on an opinion of counsel until after liability has been determined. 164 Defendants in the future may
attempt to modify this bifurcation tool to provide similar aid when the opinion of counsel defense
is asserted in the inducement context. Thus, courts may start entertaining motions to bifurcate the
infringement trial into a first phase on direct infringement liability and a second phase on
inducement and damages issues. If there is a charge of willfulness as well, the defendant may

160 See
161

id.

SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs, Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("precedent displays

the consistent theme of whether a prudent person would have had sound reason to believe that the patent was not
infringed or was invalid or unenforceable, and would be so held if litigated"): see also Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp.,
857 F.2d 1418, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[ft]he test [for willful infringement] is whether, under all the circumstances,
a reasonable person would prudently conduct himself with any confidence that a court might hold the patent invalid
or not infringed") Sharper Image Corp. v. Honeywell Int'l Inc., 222 F.R.D. 621, 630 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ("it is clear
from the authorities that 'willfulness' can be found even if the evidence is not sufficient to enable the fact finder to
determine what subjective state of mind actually accompanied the defendant's infringing conduct ... while the
target of the willfulness inquiry remains in some sense the state of mind of the alleged infringer, the courts seem
prepared to permit a plaintiff to prove 'willfulness' under either a subjective or an objective standard").
162 See Greene, Tweed of Del., Inc v. DuPont Dow Elastomers, L.L.C., 202 F.R.D. 418. 421 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
("The rationale underlying the waiver of the attorney-client privilege in this situation is one of 'fairness.' 'A party
should not be allowed to rely on self-serving documents in its defense while withholding potentially damaging
information under the guise of attorney-client privilege"') (quoting Mushroom Ass'n. v. Monterey Mushrooms,
Inc., No. C-91-1092 BAC (PJH), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19664, *10 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 1992)).
163 Thomas Presson, Comment, Knorr Bremse and Questions About Production of an Exculpatory
Legal
Opinion and the Adverse Inference. 44 IDEA 409, 422 (2004).
164

id.
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move to bifurcate inducement, willfulness and damages from the first phase on liability for direct
infringement.
A patent infringement case divided in this manner could create jury confusion as to
defendant's intent, as the jury deciding the second phase would have to determine whether the
defendant possesses either the requisite state of mind for willfulness, or intent to induce
infringement, or both. As will be discussed in the following section, a potentially destructive
implication of the inducement opinion is this confusion of willfulness and inducement issues.

C. Use of the Opinion of Counsel to Defend Against Inducement Liability Could Lead to
Confusion of Willfulness and Inducement Intent Issues
The new central role of the opinion of counsel has the potential to blur the distinction
between willfulness and inducement intent, and create doctrinal confusion between the two legal
inquiries. In the wake of DSU Medical, accused infringers will rely on opinions of counsel in one
of three situations: as a defense to a charge of willfulness, as a defense to a charge of inducement,
or as a defense to concurrent charges of willfulness and inducement. It is the last scenario that is
of the most concern because, when it arises, the finder of fact will have to tease out the distinct,
but potentially overlapping states of mind required for willfulness and inducement to determine
whether the proffered opinion is an effective defense to either or both assertions.
Thus, courts and practitioners will confront the issue of what sort of conduct rises to the level
of willfulness and how it differs, if at all, from the level of conduct that triggers inducement
liability. The Federal Circuit has suggested that liability for inducement requires less egregious
conduct than that for willful infringement. 165 In Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc.,
the court held that corporate officers who could not be held liable for willful infringement could
still be personally liable for the infringing acts of their corporations. 166 Orthokinetics, Inc.
("Orthokinetics") asserted one patent and one reissue patent directed to orthopedic wheelchairs
against STC, Entron, and three individual officers of the corporations, alleging direct
infringement, inducement, and willful infringement.16 The jury returned a verdict for the patentee
that, inter alia, the officers were personally liable for direct infringement and for inducing
infringement of both patents. 16 Defendants argued they had a good faith belief that the reissue
patent was invalid because the original patent had previously been held invalid, and that belief
precluded a finding of willfulness. 16 On a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the
district court held that, as a matter of law, the jury could not find the officers personally liable for
any infringing acts of the corporations because the officers could not be liable for willful
infringement. 170

On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict.171
The Federal Circuit held that the mere fact the corporate officers were not found to be willful
infringers did not foreclose infringement liability because the standards for liability are different
from those of willfulness:

167

See Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs. Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1579 80.
Id. at 1569.
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at 1583.
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Corporate officers are presumably aware of what they are doing, and in that sense they
can be said to have acted "willfully." However, that does not mean that their acts must
rise to the level recognized by the law as constituting willful infringement before they
can be liable for infringement by their corporation. Hence the district court erred in
positing willful infringement as a prerequisite for the imposition of personal liability for
the corporation's direct infringement. 172
Accordingly, the court reinstated the jury verdict of direct and indirect infringement. 1 3
This is a complex issue that will not quickly be resolved. In the meantime, conflation of
inducement with willfulness could frustrate the policy considerations that underlie the patent
damages regime. Fundamentally, the two doctrines are very different: inducement is a form of
infringement liability, and willfulness is a damages issue.174 Liability for infringement entitles the
patentee to routine damages intended to compensate for the losses suffered due to the infringing
acts. 175 By contrast, the goal of assessing treble damages for willfulness is to punish and deter
egregious conduct.176 To maintain these policy distinctions, the nature and levels of proof for each
claim and their defenses should be different. It is illogical that the shield for treble damages for
willfulness would be coextensive with that for inducement liability. A party whose conduct is not
egregious enough to be willful may nonetheless possess the requisite intent to induce
infringement. Under DSU Medical, however, the opinion of counsel appears to provide a potent
defense to both.

CONCLUSION

The Federal Circuit's en banc holding in DSU Medical finally resolved the perceived conflict
in the court's precedent regarding the level of intent required to prove inducement liability. There,
the full court endorsed the specific intent standard articulated in the Federal Circuit's 1990
Manville Sales opinion and held that proof of inducement requires that the patentee show the
177
alleged infringer "knew or should have known his actions would induce actual infringements.
Although the court relied on Manville Sales and the Supreme Court's opinion in MGM Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster, neither decision supports a universal application of the specific intent standard for
inducement.
A close examination of the Manville Sales decision reveals that it should apply only to its
facts, i.e., where corporate officers are exposed to personal liability for inducement. Grokster also
does not support adoption of the specific intent standard. In Grokster, the Supreme Court turned
to patent law's inducement doctrine because the doctrine permits courts to examine indicia of
intent unrelated to the design of the device or product at issue, not because of a particular level of
172

Id. at 1579.

173Id.
174 Lynda J. Oswald, Comment, The Intent Element of "Inducement to Infringe"

Under Patent Law:

Reflections on Grokster. 13 MICH.TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 225, 244 (2006).

175 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) ("Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages

adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court") (emphasis added).
17 See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576. 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("Under our cases, enhanced damages may be awarded only as a penalty for an infringer's increased culpability,
namely willful infringement or bad faith").
177DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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intent. Moreover, as a copyright decision, Grokster is a particularly poor source for determining
the appropriate level of intent for inducing patent infringement because copyright law lacks a
significant opinion of counsel defense, which is ubiquitous in patent law, and critical to rebut the
oft-made charge of willful patent infringement.
By adopting the specific intent standard, DSU Medical elevated the importance of the
opinion of counsel defense to inducement. Probably the most significant implication of this
decision is that alleged inducers will increasingly rely on the opinion of counsel to negate specific
intent and counter charges of inducing infringement. Such reliance on the opinion of counsel
defense in both the inducement and willfulness contexts could lead to doctrinal confusion of
willfulness and inducement intent. Specifically, courts and juries may conflate the conduct
implicating willfulness and that which triggers inducement liability. Yet, it is important that these
issues remain distinct because inducement liability and treble damages for willfulness have very
different policy goals. Surely there will be additional implications of DSU Medical, a decision
that eschewed consideration of such implications. Hopefully, as this and other implications of the
DSU Medical decision play out, awareness of the challenges created by its holding will prepare
courts and practitioners to properly resolve them as they arise.

